Вестник №3, 2019


Corporate ownership Vis-a-Vis disclosure: evidence from India

Текст статьи 

Shakti Deb — KIIT University, Bhubaneswar, India; Doctorate in Law, Assistant Professor at KIIT School of Law e-mail: Этот адрес электронной почты защищён от спам-ботов. У вас должен быть включен JavaScript для просмотра.

Indrajit Dube — Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Kharagpur, India; Doctorate in Law, Professor of Law at Rajiv Gandhi School of Intellectual Property Law e-mail: Этот адрес электронной почты защищён от спам-ботов. У вас должен быть включен JavaScript для просмотра.

DOI: 10.34130/2070-4992-2019-3-45-55

Corporate disclosure stands as an essential facet of corporate governance. In today's globalized world, the corporate organizational structure and their operations are moving towards complexities. Thus corporate disclosure has also taken on a new connotation of comprehensive and reliable disclosures instead of the mere release of redundant information. Adequate and timely information is a global concern to ensure corporate accountability. In spite of several regulatory efforts to converge reporting standards, the extent of corporate disclosure varies across corporations. Corporations' disclosure practice grown endogenously and variations of disclosure practices can be due to change in incentives of disclosure. Pieces of literature on corporate disclosures practices have documented that corporate ownership structure influences disclosure practices. The research empirically examined the impact of corporate ownership on corporate disclosure in Indian perspective and disclosure practices made by the corporations. Descriptive method is used by the researcher to demonstrate the longitudinal trend of corporate ownership structure. Pearson correlation analysis was undertaken to examine the strength of the linear relationship between corporate ownership and disclosure. The finding on the association between promoter ownership and corporate disclosure contradicts with the conclusions of existing literatures in developed market context, which asserts that companies with concentrated ownership discloses less information compared to companies with dispersed holding structure. The negative correlation between institutional investors, non-institutional investors; and level of disclosure implicates an absence of markets in India to push for compliance with voluntary disclosure norms. Analyzing these findings on correlation, the research suggested reforms in existing legal framework in a mandatory approach. Future research can be done on the impact of corporate ownership and disclosure after accounting the moderating and mediating factors of corporate disclosure. The index used in this research is an un-weighted disclosure index; when a weighted disclosure index will be employed by future researchers, the results might be different.

Keywords: Dispersed, Concentrated, Institutional, NonInstitutional, Ownership, Governance, Disclosure, Executive, Succession, Risk, Creditors, Shareholders, Credit Rating.


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Для цитирования: Shakti Deb, Indrajit Dube, Corporate ownership Vis-a-Vis disclosure: evidence from India // Корпоративное управление и инновационное развитие экономики Севера: Вестник Научноисследовательского центра корпоративного права, управления и венчурного инвестирования Сыктывкарского государственного университета. 2019. № 3. С. 45–55. DOI: 10.34130/2070-4992-2019-3-45-55